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CONFLICT OF LAWS
deter the widespread abuse resulting from insider trading. A proper
application of the deputization rationale serves as a valid vehicle
for preventing the insider abuse that section 16(b) was intended
to discourage. The decision in Martin Marietta represents a judic-
ial attempt -to maintain the statute's inhibiting effect while at the
same time avoiding extension of its provisions beyond circumstances
envisioned by Congress. Although on the facts presented the
court's deputization finding does not unduly extend the statute's
application, the lack of a sufficiently crystallized standard raises
the danger of an overbroad application in future cases. The dif-
ficulty in st ucturing definitive guidelines exemplifies the unwield-
iness of judicial attempts to resolve problems bordering on an area
more suited for legislative action. Thus, until such -time as Con-
gress acts -to impose additional restrictions upon insider trading, the
courts should be reluctant to manipulate the congressionally sanc-
tioned standards of section 16(b).
WILLIAM B. LAWRENCE
CONFLICT OF LAWS - TORTS - HUSBAND AND WIFE
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968).
Over recent years a frequent and seemingly endless dilemma of
choice-of-laws has confronted this nation's courts. Today's mobile
and complex society' has magnified the dilemma and created an ur-
gent need to resolve the problem -raised by much of the present day
litigation involving parties whose activities have come within the
jurisdiction of several states. Past answers to conflict of laws have
proved to be -too inflexible,2 too general, or in many instances, lack-
ing a realistic connection with either the parties involved in the lit-
igation or the legislative policies of the related states.3 As a
1 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw (SEcoND) CONFLICr OF LAWS, Introductory
Note to Topic 1, Chapter 7 (Proposed Official Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT].
2 Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965) (interspousal tort
immunity conflict). In rejecting Nebraska law (the place of the accident), the Wis-
consin court stated: "Instead of the rigidly applied rule of lex loci [delictil, we adopt
a flexible but, we believe, a practical and workable principle to be used in solving
'choice of law' problems." Id. at 621, 133 N.W.2d at 410.
3 See RESTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Topic 1, Chapter 7, at 2.
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result, courts have continued to search for a better solution and ap-
proach that could lend predictability and, at the same time, realism
to decisions.
The rule of lex loci delicti, the law of the place of the accident
governs, is one answer that has long dominated the field of conflicts
in spite of increasingly strong opposition to it.4  However, the Su-
preme Court of Arizona, when recently confronted with a conflicts
problem in a case of first impression, summarily discarded the old
rule of lex loci delecti and replaced it with a new solution to choice-
of-laws. As a result of an automobile accident in Arizona involving
a New York couple, the wife brought an action against her husband
and the driver of the other car to recover for her personal injuries.
Of paramount importance in Schwartz v. Schwartz5 was the initial
question of Mrs. Schwartz's capacity to sue her husband in tort for
negligence. This problem arose when the Arizona law of inter-
spousal immunity6 ran headlong into the New York law permitting
such actions.7 Mrs. Schwartz's suit against her husband was dis-
missed and the decision was affirmed in the lower state courts in
light of Arizona's past adherence to the doctrine of lex loci delicti.8
Clearly the dismissal was correct if lex loci was to remain the con-
trolling rule; however, the Arizona Supreme Court chose to examine
the fundamental question whether to retain the established doctrine
or to adopt a different approach to choice-of-laws.
After a perfunctory examination of existing choice-of-laws theo-
ries propounded both by scholars and courts in recent years, the
Arizona court adopted the contacts theory9 as its preferred approach
to all choice-of-laws problems. This theory seemed to offer the
count the "brightest prospects for a rational yet flexible approach."'"
4 Referring to the old rule of lex loci delicti, the Wilcox court stated:
tTlhe mere fact that a rule is old does not make it bad. In fact, its an-
tiquity is compelling evidence that it must have been reasonably satisfactory,
and the rule, though old, should be retained if it continues to serve its purpose.
We need, however, only to cite a few examples to see that the application of
the rule of lex loci has on occasions produced absurd and unjust results. 26
Wis. 2d at 622, 133 N.W.2d at 410.
For further discussion of the rule, see notes 13-18 infra & accompanying text.
5 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968).
6 Arizona follows the common law doctrine prohibiting husband-wife suits for
negligent torts. Id. at 255.
7 New York had abolished such immunity by statute in 1964. 1d.
8 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 7 Ariz. App. 445, 440 P.2d 326 (1968).
9 For a discussion of this theory, see note 36 & text accompanying notes 28-35 infra.
The contacts theory has been adopted in recent Tentative Drafts to the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.
10 103 Ariz. at 562, 447 P.2d at 257.
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Applying the contacts theory to the Schwartz case, the court found
that New York ,had the most significant contacts with the parties
and with the occurrence,"- and therefore the law of New York
should determine the wife's capacity to sue her husband. Use of
this theory meant that each issue of the case must be independently
examined for significant contacts to determine the law applicable
to that issue.'2 Conceivably a situation could arise where New
York law would be determinative of one issue in the case, while
Arizona law might be used for another issue in the same case.
It is suggested that the four major choice-of-laws theories exa-
mined by the court - lex loci delicti, lex loci domicillii, the govern-
ment interest theory, and the contacts theory - represent more of
an evolution of the rational approach to all choice-of-laws problems
than they do an actual divergence of incompatible views. In order
to conceptualize this evolution it is necessary to examine in detail
the various theories preceding the contacts theory.
Lex loci delicti, a derivation from the vested rights doctrine,'
is the oldest and least flexible of all the modern theories on con-
flicts questions. It provides simplicity and predictability in its ap-
plication, for it merely requires use of the law of the state in which
the cause of action arose. Often, however, difficult cases brought
departures from the rule'4 and courts today are prone to ignore the
rule in order to arrive at what they feel is a just result. 5 Some
courts distinguish between procedural and substantive issues in a
case,16 applying lex loci delicti only to the substantive law of the
1 The contacts that the court considered were: "(a) the place where the injury oc-
curred, (b) the place where the conduct occurred, (c) the domicile, nationality, place
of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the rela-
tionship, if any, between the parties is centered." Id. at 257, quoting RESTATEMENT
§ 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1968). See also notes 38-39, 41 infra.
-12 103 Ariz. at 566, 447 P.2d at 258. "In other words, the identity of the state of
the most significant relationship is said to depend upon the nature of the tort and upon
the particular issue." RESTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Topic 1, Chapter 7, at 2.
13 RESTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Topic 1, Chapter 7, at 1. This doctrine
"called for the enforcement everywhere of rights that had been lawfully created under
the local law of a state." Id.
14 As noted in Wilcox: "It appears therefore, that lex loci has not provided a
'fixed star,' but rather has been merely a point of departure in hard cases." 26 Wis. 2d
at 624, 133 N.W.2d at 412.
15 In a recent Kentucky decision the court stated: 'To say that the law of the
state where an automobile accident occurs always governs the rights of the parties
avoids the necessity of examining the true legal relationship of the parties or other
considerations which might be more consonant with a just result." Wessling v.
Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky. 1967).
$6 See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964); Wilcox v.
Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d at 624, 133 N.W.2d at 412.
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state. Other courts ignore the rule completely in favor of what
are professed to be overriding state policies. 17 Consequently in re-
cent years few, if any, courts automatically apply 'the rule as origin-
ally conceived. Lex loci delicti in its original form is a dying
concept, and yet a majority of the courts cling tenaciously to the
doctrine for lack of a good replacement. 18
The law of domestic relations, and particularly that controlling
intrafamily torts, serves special needs that could not be filled by the
fortuities of a lex loci doctrine. These special considerations pro-
vided the stimulus for the introduction of a new theory, lex loci
domicillii, and one further departure from the original lex loci
doctrine. The domicillii rationale is founded on the concept that
in order to preserve the harmony and unity of marriage, people
ought to be governed by one set of rules that follows them in their
travels. The policy underlying this rule is that it would be ex-
tremely difficult for families to govern their daily relationships if
Originally the doctrine of lex loci was applied arbitrarily to all substantive issues of
a case without regard to interrelationships of the parties, the occurrence, or a particular
issue. Predictably, the law governing a case, for example in the area of negligent torts,
might bear little relevance to the parties or issues. RESTATEMENT, Introductory Note
to Topic 1, Chapter 7, at 2. Any connection between a negligent act and the parties
was entirely fortuitous. As indicated by the Wilcox court:
All of the commentators and all of the cases that end up in disagreement
with the unbending application of lex loci have a common thread that runs
through the skein of rationale, and that thread is that the place of the occur-
rence of an unintentional tort is fortuitous, and it is by mere happenstance
that the lex loci state is concerned at all. 26 Wis. 2d at 629, 133 N.W.2d
at 414.
On the other hand, the intentional tortfeasor can be presumed to have contemplated
his actions and the law of the place where the act occurred should properly govern.
This distinction between negligent and intentional torts could be the basis for some of
the departures from the application of the older conflicts rules.
The commercial world evidenced an early recognition of the importance of pro-
viding a proper nexus among the governing body of law, the parties and the issues.
Through guidance from the Uniform Commercial Code, the area of contract law de-
parted from old lex loci concepts and is now generally governed by a contacts rationale.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105, Comment 3. Arizona adopted the Code
effective January 1, 1968. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-2201 (1968).
-7See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964) (to avoid ex-
penditure of public funds and possible hardship to his family, a spendthrift's contracts
are voidable); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965) (policy to
provide compensation for negligent injuries). As stated by the Lilienthal Court:
"Foreign law would not be applied if it '* * would violate some fundamental principle
of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal."' 239 Ore. at 18, 395 P.2d at 547, quoting Mr. Justice Cardozo in
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918) (dissenting
opinion).
18 For a compilation of family relations cases following lex loci delicti, see Annot.,
96 A.L.R.2d 973 (1964).
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they were subject to variable laws as they traveled from one state to
another.19
Although not without merit, lex loci domicillii appears to be
another jurisdiction-selecting rule2" which is nearly as arbitrary as
lex loci delicti. Fortunately, however, many of the courts utilizing
the domicillii doctrine have unwittingly done more than arbitra-
rily apply the rule.2 It appears that they have also considered why
they should apply the law of the domicile by comparing competing
policies of the interested states.' Where this has been done either
consciously or unconsciously, most observers would agree that the
results have been satisfactory. Nevertheless, there have been arbi-
trary applications of the rule that have produced inappropriate deci-
sions if considered in the light of all competing interests.23
Professor Brainerd Currie through his "government interest the-
ory" began to articulate what -the courts had been grasping at with
something less than complete success - the necessity for recogni-
tion of competing interests involved in choice-of-laws situations.
This observation added interest analysis to the compendium of con-
flicts solutions. Currie's contribution was valuable in providing a
more rational approach to conflicts problems, as well as creating a
vehicle with which to cull out the "false conflict" from the "true
conflict."2 4  The false conflict arose where a state had no real in-
19 See generally Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Haums-
child v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959); RESTATEMENT,
Explanatory Notes § 11.
20 
"In other words, domicile was the key used to choose a jurisdiction to supply the
governing law, without regard to the content of that law, not as a factor relevant to a
choice between a rule conferring immunity and one denying it." Cavers, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
1219, 1221 (1963) [symposium hereinafter cited as Comments on Babcock).
21 I a mobile society it is not unusual for a family to have both a temporary resi-
dence and a domicile, or home of record. Careless intermingling by courts and writers
of the terms "residence" and "domicile" could create confusion with interpretation of the
rule and of decisions based on the rule. The Restatement, Chapter 2, attempts to clarify
these terms, but unless all writers adhere uniformly to this or some other standard the
possibility of confusion will persist22 See, e.g., Magid v. Decker, 251 F. Supp. 955 (W.D. Wis. 1966) (interspousal
immunity); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (intrafamily tort
immunity); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (survivorship
of action after death of tort-feasor); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544(1966) (interspousal immunity). For a critical analysis of the domicillii rationale,
see B. Currie, Comments on Babcock, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1233 (1963); D. Currie,
Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 595 (1968).
23 See B. Currie, supra note 22; Weintraub, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15
U.CL.A.L. REV. 556 (1968).
24 What may at first appear to be a conflict is really a "false conflict" if it is shown
that one state has no real interest in applying its laws. See B. CURRIE, SELECTED
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terest in the litigation, other than the fortuitous relationship that
might arise, for example, in an automobile accident involving only
out-of-state parties. There would be no valid interest in applying
that state's law to the case. On the other hand, where the forum
state had any interest at all (Currie's "true conflict"), lex fori, the
law of the forum, should be applied even though a stronger policy
of the other interested state might thereby be defeated.25 Here
again there is a hint of arbitrariness, but it is interposed at a later
step in the process than with either of the two previous theories.
Since 1955,26 an increasing number of courts -have recognized
the importance of the competing -interests of both states and liti-
gants in the process of final resolution of choice-of-laws. Although
the courts were unwilling in many instances to fully endorse Cur-
rie's theory, they did retain the concept of interest analysis. 27 Grow-
ing from this concept, the contacts theory28 appears to combine the
best aspects of all the aforementioned theories. This theory re-
quires application of the law of the state which has the most signif-
icant contacts both with the occurrence and with the parties. There
is use of lex loci delicti concepts, interest analysis after separation
of issues, and a mating of family law and tort law through lex loci
domicillii. Proponents of the contacts theory agree that the signifi-
cant contacts would be meaningless unless determined in terms of
policies and interests of both the states and the parties involved,29
for a mere counting of the contacts would not be beneficial but
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF.
L. REV. 74 (1967).
25 Whitman, Conflict of Spousal Immunity Laws: The Legislature Takes a Hand, 46
N.C.L. REv. 506, 514 (1967-68).
"Eventually we must accept the proposition that, in the absence of action by higher
authority, each state must be conceded the right to apply its own laws for the reasonable
effectuation of its own policies." B. Currie, supra note 22, at 1237.
2 6 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
27 For a progression of cases in three states using interest analysis, see Grant v.
McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289
P.2d 218 (1955); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31
(1967); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963); Kjeldsen v. Ballard, 52 Misc. 2d 952, 277 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Spec. T. 1967);
Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959); Haynie
v. Hanson, 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (1962); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d
617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Magid v. Decker, 251 F. Supp. 955 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
28 Use of this theory in the New York case of Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), provided a major impetus to its growth
and eventual acceptance in the later tentative drafts to the Restatement. See, e.g., Tenta-
tive Drafts Nos. 8, 9.
29 B. Currie, supra note 22, at 1235.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
rather could result in courts "groping''30 for contacts to promote
use of forum law. The contacts theory differs from Currie's theory
of governmental interest because it requires weighing the compet-
ing interests to determine which should be given greater considera-
tion in the decision making process, and from this qualitative
comparison -the final choice-of-laws is made."- Professor Ehrenz-
weig, an eminent authority in the field of conflicts, is of the opin-
ion that this weighing of the contacts -is a step beyond -the Currie
theory;" yet perhaps it is nothing more than a modernization of
Currie's distinction between true and false conflicts.3"
Ideally, if the contacts theory is workable, a change of the forum
should not produce a different result. If the courts have properly
analyzed and accurately weighed the policies and contacts of each
of the states involved in the litigation, location of the forum is im-
material. However, critics 'have expressed the concern -that applica-
tion of the contacts theory is fraught with the danger of forum
courts unconsciously advancing the interests of the forum state by
attaching more significance to its contacts in order -to guard against
the loss of judicial sovereignty."' Such fear may be grounded on
results of many of the early cases where, because of the particular
facts involved, the state having the most significant contacts con-
veniently happened -to be also the forum state. Similar results oc-
curred with application of the lex domicillii rule. Thus, there is a
strong suggestion ,that the decisions were merely an application of
forum law under the guise of a new theory, and that the courts may
not have been so willing to apply such a -theory if the weight of
other contacts 'had been elsewhere.85
30 Baer, Two Approaches to Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws: Mechanical
Jurisprudence versus Groping for Contacts, 16 BUFFALO L REv. 537, 567 (1966-67).
31 See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963); RESTATEmENT §§ 6, 145 and comments thereto.
32 Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock, 63 COLUM. L REV. 1243 (1963).
33 See notes 24-25 supra & accompanying text.
34 See generally Ehrenzweig, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L REv.
570 (1968); Leflar, Comments on Babcock, 63 COLuM. L. REv. 1247 (1963).
"[C] ourts continue to pick and choose among contacts according to their own table
of Sigs [significant contacts)." Baer, supra note 30, at 556. But see Cavers, supra
note 20, at 1228, wherein he writes:
I prefer Justice Traynor's view that "the forces against provincialism are
strong today," that: "a judge trained to look through the partisan wrappings
of a conflict will be inclined to look through provincial wrappings as well.
There is no reason why he should be less dispassionate in a conflicts case
than in any other. The hazard is less of impassioned provincialism than
of the lingering ills of a passive formalism." (footnote omitted).
35 These fears, raised in such typical cases as Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617,
133 N.W.2d 408 (1965), Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
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It is notable that the Arizona Supreme Court chose Schwartz as
the vehicle with which to discard lex loci delicti. In view of the
court's decision that New York had the most significant contacts
relating to the issue of capacity to sue, -there can be no suggestion
that -the Arizona court was merely advancing its own state's interests,
or that it intended the other courts of the state to do so in the
future. On the contrary, it is evident that Arizona has indeed
adopted the rationale of the contacts theory. Of the material con-
tacts involved in Schwartz, quantitatively there appeared to be a
balance. However, as noted earlier, under this theory the deter-
mination of the most significant contacts should be primarily quali-
tative, not quantitative.36  It was necessary for the court to evaluate
the contacts in light of the particular issue, the policies and inter-
ests of the states involved, the occurrence, and the parties." It was
only after this process, aided by guidelines set forth in the Restate-
N.Y.S.2d 273 (1963), and Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955),
have been dispelled to some degree by later cases within those same jurisdictions.
Cases such as Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967),
and Kjeldsen v. Ballard, 52 Misc. 2d 952, 277 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Spec. T. 1967), have
applied a law other than that of the forum to the issue at hand, the latter by recogniz-
ing more significant contacts in another state, and the former by recognizing that the
forum state had no interest.
If the courts can suppress any tendency to advance their own interests and instead
analyze the contacts with reference to what Ehrenzweig calls a "superlaw" rather than
to their own law, then the results should be ideal. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 34, at
574.
3 6 The qualitative considerations that combine to make up the rationale of the con-
tacts theory have been divided in the Restatement into five groups of principles:
1) Those that promote mutually harmonious and beneficial relationships in
the interdependent community.
2) Those that focus upon purposes, policies, aims, and objectives of each of
the competing local laws (state interests).
3) Those that protect the justified expectations of the parties, providing
certainty and predictability of result.
4) Those that serve to implement the basic policies underlying the partic-
ular field of law.
5) Those that look to the needs of judicial administration. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, comment b to § 145.
37 Although the contacts theory appears to have practical application to the so-
called difficult case, there will be a greater burden on the courts and on counsel to im-
partially sift and meaningfully assess the policies and interests of the states and of the
parties involved. In a period when dockets are filled to overflowing, it is understand-
able that courts may be hesitant to wholeheartedly endorse such a task. As noted in a
brief submitted to the Schwartz court:
The spreading disenchantment with the amorphous "center of gravity" rule
can be traced to the realization that it is not a rule at all. This explains why
writers of textbooks and law review articles are more sympathetic to it than
are the judges who must apply it on a day to day basis to real life situa-
tions. Brief for Appellee at 16, Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447
P.2d 254 (1968).
CONFLICT OF LAWS
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws, that the Schwartz court de-
cided that New York law should apply to the issue.38
The court was able to resolve through use of the Restatement
a quantitative balance of contacts. However, it can only be a mat-
ter for conjecture what would have happened if qualitatively there
had been a balance. Neither the Schwartz court nor the drafters
of the Restatement appear to have been concerned with this poten-
tial problem. The court may well have thought a qualitative bal-
ance to be impossible in light of the many factors to be considered.
Indeed, the question was unnecessary to the Schwartz decision, and
the case would not have been an appropriate vehicle with which
to resolve this question. It would seem, however, that guidance
for the Arizona courts may be appropriate for certainly the poten-
tial for such a balance exists. 3 In light of the necessity to give
weight to the policies and interests of a state in a qualitative assess-
ment of contacts, where the contacts are balanced qualitatively the
situation approaches the ultimate in what Currie envisions as the
true conflict. A completely impartial assessment of contacts, on
the other hand, approximates comparison with Professor Ehrenz-
weig's "superlaw"4 - that illusive law in the sky which is partial
to no particular state interest. Pragmatically, it may be impossible
to qualitatively assess contacts in relation to an impartial, fictional
set of laws. Ultimately, evaluation may relate to the forum state's
policies and laws, and if a balance occurs the courts must rely on
some arbitrary measure as was done with each of the other theories.
Perhaps Currie's suggested use of forum law when confronted with
the true conflict is the only solution, that in reality in each of the
preceding theories it was recognized that eventually in the legal
process the arbitrary coin must be tossed. It is suggested that dis-
satisfaction with each of the old theories may have grown out of
the realization that arbitrary measures such as those used in lex loci
and lex domicilii were employed too soon in the determination
process. In an effort to provide decisions founded on a rational con-
sideration of interrelated but competing interests, proponents of
3 8 See note 11 supra. The court quoted in part section 379 of Tentative Draft No.
9 of the Restatement: "In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the
forum will consider the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant purposes of
the tort rules of the interested states."
3 9 Apparently the writers of the Restatement did not consider the possibility that
the situation could arise where contacts would balance qualitatively, for no provision
has been made for such contingency. The weight assigned the contacts will obviously
vary through the subjective interpretations of the individual courts.
40 hrenzweig, supra note 34, at 574.
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each new theory discarded the old and required more analysis of
the facts in the cases. By adopting the contacts theory, Arizona
has taken a major step to insure a fair and appropriate application
of the law controlling the cases coming before its courts, even
though it may still be necessary to make an arbitrary choice of laws
if ever confronted with the dilemma of balanced contacts. 41
It would appear -that the Arizona Supreme Court has charted a
good course for its future conflicts case law. Admittedly, some of
the terms used in the Restatement are vague and subject to many
interpretations.42 It will not always be easy to decide the conflict;
the process may be involved and tedious, and no two courts may
completely agree on the importance of the contacts.43  To approach
wisely this task of coordinating the laws of many states as -they af-
fect the relations between two or more people, the law of conflicts
"must have a flexibility of method that will enable it to cope with
the infinite variety of human transactions that cut across state and
4 1 The Arizona court also may have left a question unresolved by its failure to
clarify the use of quotations apparently from Tentative Draft No. 9 of the Restatement.
Passages from the more recent Proposed Official Draft of the Restatement had been
presented in a Brief of Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562,
447 P.2d 254 (1968), but for unknown reasons the Proposed Official Draft was not
used in the court's opinion. There are significant differences between the two drafts,
and lower courts of Arizona may feel compelled to follow Draft No. 9 until given
further guidance from their supreme court. Compare §§ 379, 390g of Tentative Draft
No. 9, with §§ 6, 145, 169 of the Proposed Official Draft.
The Official Draft provides the courts with better guidance in choice-of-laws prind-
pies, makes it clear that issues are to be considered separately, and considers both
domicile and residence as possible contacts - attributes that are lacking in Draft No.
9. Furthermore, in the area of intrafamily immunity Draft No. 9 is simply a rule of
lex loci domicillii. The Official Draft, while giving considerable importance to the
domicile contact, recognizes there may be more important contacts and thus is not
limited to a mere jurisdiction-selecting rule.
4 2 As pointed out by one writer:
The expressions "center of gravity" and "grouping of contacts" are at least
as adequate to define a principle of law as the terms "due process of law,"
"property," ...which the courts constantly employ. One reason for their
generality is that we are at a new beginning .... At the early stage in any
field of the law common-law courts are accustomed to employ very general
terms. Cheatham, Comments on Babcock, 63 COLum. L. REv. 1229, 1230
(1963).
Using goals of justiciability, certainty, predictability, and simplicity, case law will then
shape this contact theory and channel it in the desired direction. See RESTATEMENT,
stpra note 1, at § 6 and comments thereto.
43 Compare the language of the Arizona Court of Appeals in 7 Ariz. App. at 448,
440 P.2d at 329, wherein the court states: "Under almost any theory including the
'grouping of contacts theory', 'the most significant contacts', or the 'center of gravity',
the State of Arizona would have the most contacts, the most significant contacts, ...
and not the State of New York," with the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court.
103 Ariz. 562, 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968).
